NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Since the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the world has known of the horrors of the nuclear threat. The massive stockpile of nuclear weapons that has risen since - to the point that the planet could be blown up thousands of times over - compounds people’s fear of nuclear devastation, and shows the absurdity and destructiveness that those in power have yielded on our living planet.
This paper discusses the numerous methods by which civil nuclear programs can – and do – contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. According to Ian Hore-Lacy from the Uranium Information Centre 1 : “Happily, proliferation is only a fraction of what had been feared when the NPT was set up, and none of the problem arises from the civil nuclear cycle.” Hore-Lacy's statement could hardly be further from the truth.
Who's Watching the Nuclear Watchdog?
A Critique of the Australian Safeguards
and Non-Proliferation Office
Authors: Richard Broinowski , Tilman Ruff, Alan Roberts and Jim Green
EnergyScience Briefing Paper #19
Contents
About the Authors
About the EnergyScience Coalition
Acronyms
1. Executive Summary
2. Introduction (Richard Broinowski)
3. Summaries of Sections 4-6
4 Australian Uranium Exports to China (Tilman Ruff)
5. Plutonium and Proliferation (Alan Roberts)
6. Fact or Fission (Jim Green)
About the Authors
Professor Richard Broinowski is an Adjunct Professor at the University of Sydney and a former Australian Ambassador to Vietnam , Republic of Korea , Mexico , the Central American Republics and Cuba . He is the author of Fact or Fission: the Truth about Australia 's Nuclear Ambitions ( Melbourne : Scribe, 2003).
Assoc. Prof. Tilman Ruff is an infectious diseases and public health physician; Australian management committee chair, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, supported by Poola Foundation (Tom Kantor Fund); immediate past president of the Medical Association for Prevention of War ( Australia ); Associate Professor, Nossal Institute for Global Health, University of Melbourne ; medical advisor, International Department, Australian Red Cross; technical advisor on immunisation (Pacific), UNICEF and AusAID; and member, Board of Directors, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW).
Dr Alan Roberts holds a Ph.D. in physics ( University of Sydney ) and has lectured in physics at Sydney and Monash universities. He formerly served on the advisory Nuclear Safety committee of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency. His research work is on problems of theoretical ecology.
Dr Jim Green is the national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth and national coordinatorof the Beyond Nuclear Initiative. He has an honours degree in public health and a PhD in science and technology studies for his doctoral thesis on the Lucas Heights research reactor debates. He is the author of the September 2005 report, ‘Nuclear Power: No Solution to Climate Change', available at <www.foe.org.au/campaigns/anti-nuclear>.
Acronyms
ANSTO – Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation
AONM – Australian-obligated nuclear materials – e.g. Australian-origin uranium and its by-products such as depleted uranium and plutonium
ASNO – Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office
CTBT – Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DFAT – Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DOE – (US) Department of Energy
DPRK – Democratic People's Republic of Korea a.k.a. North Korea
FMCT – Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
HEU – Highly-enriched uranium
IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency
LEU – Low-enriched uranium
LWR – Light water reactor
MUF – Material Unaccounted For
NPT – Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction
1. Executive Summary
This EnergyScience Briefing Paper raises serious concerns regarding the competence and professionalism of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO). ASNO's mission, to prevent nuclear proliferation dangers associated with Australia 's uranium exports, is a task vital to the long-term security of Australians and all people. This paper details a large number of statements made by ASNO which are false or misleading. The evidence compiled raises critical questions of good governance, and leads inescapably to the conclusion that the safeguards on Australian uranium which ASNO is responsible for implementing are deeply flawed both in their design and in their execution.
This situation requires redress.
The authors of this paper believe there is a compelling case for major reform of ASNO as a matter of urgency. An alternative course of action would be for the Australian government to establish an independent public inquiry. Such an inquiry should have a broad mandate to review all aspects of ASNO's structure and function, should be adequately resourced, and should have powers similar to those of a Royal Commission to access witnesses, documents and other evidence.
Such an inquiry should be carried out independently of ASNO. It should also be carried out independently of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), given that the current relationship between ASNO and DFAT is arguably one of the areas in need of review. DFAT has declined a request to review a paper detailing numerous inaccurate statements made by ASNO (letter to NGOs, 28 May 2007 , available on request).
Such an inquiry should address the competence and performance of ASNO; its scientific and technical expertise; whether its current management, organisation, structure and relationships best serve its mandate; any conflicts of interest; the implications of ASNO's structural connection to DFAT (whether it has sufficient independence or operates as a ‘captured bureaucracy'); and options for reform including consideration of organisational models in other countries.
ASNO's previous responses to criticism have included angry and dismissive attacks on its critics, assertions that an entire document can be dismissed on the basis of questionable challenges to just one or two points (see for example ASNO, ‘Reactor Grade Plutonium', www.asno.dfat.gov.au/infosheets/rgp_dec06.pdf>), and a conspicuous failure to address the substance of a large majority of the criticisms. We sincerely hope that the multiple serious concerns raised in this paper will prompt serious consideration by government and parliamentarians, and responses which are substantive and constructive.
The authors of this paper intend to continue to monitor ASNO's activities and its statements. The matters raised here go to the heart of Australia 's obligations as a major uranium exporting nation. We hope that it will not be long before the Australian government addresses the unacceptable and untenable situation which currently prevails regarding a matter of such critical importance to the security of Australians and the world as preventing further nuclear proliferation.
Richard Broinowski
Tilman Ruff
Alan Roberts
Jim Green
August, 2007.